And so continues a day in the life of a cybercriminal who somehow scammed Apple, not once, but 42 times…ironically, the reverse of his age, which is 24.
Sharron Laverne Parrish, Jr. is apparently “da boss” when it comes to authorization code scamming, and what’s even sillier, it’s really simple. Here’s what Parrish did in 4 easy steps:
- Visited Apple stores.
- Tried to buy products with 4 different debit cards that were closed by all respective financial institutions, so the cards were declined.
- Parrish protested and offered to call his bank…except he wasn’t really calling.
- After his “phone call,” Parrish gave fake authorization codes, containing a specific number of digits that is usually provided by card issuers to create a record of the card override.
Of course, I’m not going to share with you the number of digits to create a successful override. Like Tampa Bay Times, I wouldn’t want to “inspire anyone,” but, I will say that the problem is with the system. As long as the number of digits used as the override code is correct, the actual override code itself doesn’t matter. The code can be any combination of numbers.
It sounds so unbelievable that it worked! Parrish scammed Apple out of $309,768, according to federal court records. I can’t help but wonder, though, who besides Parrish is at fault: the bank for having such a lackadaisical approach to authorization codes or the Apple employees for actually carrying out the override?
What advice would you give to financial intuitions about creating unique, unbreakable authorization codes? And, what advice would you give to Apple in creating employee policies to prevent this from happening again?
As always, looking forward to your reactions, thoughts, comments and opinions.