Improving Nuclear Smuggling Detection Goal Of Computer Model
A professor at The University of Texas at Austin has received $1.9 million to expand a computer model that is already helping guide national decisions about placement of devices to detect nuclear smuggling attempts.
The Department of Homeland Security provided the funds to improve the design of networks of sensors to detect smuggling in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union that have insufficient security for their stores of nuclear weapons material and radioactive material. Nearly 300 nuclear smuggling attempts have been reported to the United Nations from these countries since 1995.
In the past four years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has used the basic nuclear smuggling model developed by Dr. David Morton and former graduate student Feng Pan to help combat this trend by providing guidance for national decisions on radiation detector placement in Russia and nearby countries.
“Russia’s got the biggest border of any country on the planet, making it highly unlikely the country could seal its borders,” Morton said. “So the real issue becomes: given the limited resources and the fact that radiation detectors can cost upwards of $1 million to set up, can we provide a computer tool that locates the detectors optimally?”
The United States has provided more than $100 million to place radiation detectors at Moscow’s main airport and other sites where smugglers could escape with material for preparing nuclear weapons or dirty bombs. Still, hundreds more potential nuclear smuggling sites in Russia and around the world could use radiation detectors. The computer model seeks to prioritize decisions on sites to outfit based on:
- Routes smugglers typically take to reach buyers willing to pay millions for their stash.
- Nuclear and radioactive materials most likely to be smuggled.
- Methods smugglers will use to conceal their dangerous cargo.
The computer model in use at Los Alamos considers smugglers’ passage through pedestrian, automobile, rail, airport and sea crossings. Los Alamos also uses Morton’s nuclear smuggling model for detective work when a smuggler is captured. The goal is to go beyond speculation about the source of the material and other details.
“It’s common for a smuggler to transport really small amounts of nuclear material,” said Morton, who holds an Engineering Foundation Endowed Professorship. “The danger is that this nuclear material actually represents a larger mass at risk of being stolen if a buyer likes the original sample provided.”
With the $1.9 million from the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office of the Department of Homeland Security, Morton and fellow mechanical engineering faculty will spend five years expanding his computer model for placing radiation detectors with detailed information about smuggling scenarios and models of smugglers’ strategic behavior.