Where Checkpoint Screening Goes Wrong

• By Ralph C. Jensen
• Jan 03, 2008

The last thing you want to find out while flying from one city to another is that airport security has been compromised. With so many people choosing flights as a preferred mode of transportation, airport security is paramount.

Like many of our readers, I logged thousands of miles via air travel in 2007—gratefully, all without incident. But it would seem that security is another matter.

In testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the Government Accountability Office dispatched its own investigators to examine TSA’s passenger screening process. In many cases, GAO investigators succeeded in passing through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with components for numerous improvised explosive devices and an improvised incendiary device. These components were concealed in carry-on luggage and on themselves.

The GAO undertook this study in August 2006 after TSA substantially modified its passenger screening policies. This was based on the alleged transatlantic bomb plot uncovered by authorities in Britain. TSA wanted to close the security gaps revealed by the plot and, therefore, revised policies that restricted the amount of liquids, gels and aerosols that passengers could bring through a checkpoint.

Six years after 9/11, airport screeners are pretty good at spotting terrorists, but there’s an excellent chance anyone trained to get past airport security will succeed.

GAO officials decided to test the screening process via covert means and identified two types of devices that a terrorist could use to cause severe damage to an aircraft that also would threaten the safety of the passengers. The first device was an IED made of a liquid explosive and a lowyield detonator. Even the detonator itself could function as an IED, but it was determined that a liquid explosive would cause more damage.

The components identified in the covert operation were passed by screeners at 19 U.S. airports. It should be noted that some of these airports employ private screeners and, therefore, are not part of TSA. But it’s rather amazing how GAO investigators pulled this off. First of all, they scanned publicly available TSA materials and then designed a means to get past security. What’s even more frightening is that screeners had been tipped off that such a challenge would take place. Also, an internal TSA memo went as far as to give physical descriptions of some testers and their methods for concealing the components.

And if things couldn’t get any scarier, the components for these devices were obtained at local stores and over the Internet for less than $150. Still wondering if these devices would work? They were tested at a national laboratory in July 2007, and it was clearly demonstrated that a terrorist using these devices could cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of the passengers.

What GAO officials found was that it is possible to bring the components for several IEDs and one incendiary device through TSA checkpoints and onto flights without being challenged. Security officers screen all luggage before allowing passengers to proceed to departure gates. The technology used by security officers includes walkthrough metal detectors, X-ray machines, handheld metal detectors and explosive trace detection equipment.

Screeners at Los Angeles International Airport missed 75 percent of fake bombs during tests that took place two years ago. TSA does have a legitimate excuse, but pardon me while I put my tongue in cheek—they said the tests were difficult and designed to trip up the screeners. Does

TSA then believe that terrorists like al Qaeda will bring its bombs to security checkpoints in packages clearly marked “bomb?”

TSA Administrator Kip Hawley came to the defense of his screeners, saying that this represents only one layer of airport security. There are, of course, bomb-sniffing dogs and air crews trained in self defense, he said. I travel quite a bit, and I’ve never seen a bomb-sniffing dog. I have, however, been subject to a full-body pat-down search, where screeners complete additional searches, including the use of explosive trace detection equipment to detect any irregularities in body contour that might represent concealed items.

Although the practice is considered somewhat controversial, TSA has been experimenting with behavioral screening. As many as 2,000 TSA employees have been trained to look for signs of stress or unusual behavior. Passengers considered suspicious may find themselves under the hot lamp for questioning or even a search.

Consider this: More than 43,000 travelers have been flagged by behavior-detecting screeners since January 2006. Yes, there have been some arrests; in fact, 278 people were arrested. None of the people arrested have been detained on terrorism-related charges. Don’t you think that in a random sweep of more than 43,000 people, at least 278 criminals would have turned up?

Whether this technique works or not is subject to question, but what is certain is the fact that screeners need training in basic observation skills. Another measure to take is to reprimand screeners who consistently fail tests.

After spending billions of dollars over the past six years, how is it that TSA officials can fail to stop dangerous materials from entering airport premises? Congress should deem this unacceptable and instruct Hawley to fix the problem, or be dismissed.

TSA has a significant challenge in balancing security with efficient passenger movement at security checkpoints, and it should position itself to plug the holes that still remain open.

This article originally appeared in the issue of .