Editor's Note
When Money Talks, Security Listens
- By Ralph C. Jensen
- Mar 02, 2007
IN early January, the Department of Homeland Security announced it had a whopping $1.7 billion for this fiscal year to be used for grants specifically related to counterterrorism efforts on the state and local level. The same program provides $445 million for the protection of critical infrastructure, including seaports, mass transit systems, chemical and nuclear facilities, passenger rail and highways.
Transportation infrastructure protection has always been a top priority for the current administration, and it should be noted that DHS has taken unprecedented steps to protect critical infrastructure both at the state and local level.
DHS officials have assessed tens of thousands of critical infrastructure sites, and facilities and security plans have been poured over to examine threats, vulnerabilities and potential consequences of attacks. Homeland security experts from DHS, the Coast Guard, TSA and many interagency partners have joined forces with the private sector to assess the sites, work with owners and operators to develop and review security plans, test those plans, then make recommendations to improve protective measures.
One of the most critical veins of security is to issue rail security regulations that would improve upon the protection of rail cargo. The railroad is used to transport tons of volatile chemicals that can have very toxic effects on the population.
I believe TSA looks at the transportation system as a network that includes key pieces, such as aviation, rail, highway, transit, pipeline and ferries, as functioning parts of the network. The United States needs a functioning transportation network with overall security requirements.
As far as rail security is concerned, TSA has divided the topic into three categories: system security, access control and en-route security. System security and access control refer to practices affecting the security of the railroad and its property. En-route security refers to the actual movement and handling of railcars containing hazardous toxic inhalation materials.
While there is no one solution for all locations and circumstances, there are a number of security items that allow for flexibility in implementation based on assessed vulnerability of a particular process or operation. TSA believes the human element will always play a vital role in security, and indeed it will. TSA plans to designate an individual with overall responsibility for hazardous materials transportation security planning. This also includes training and implementation. Another person should be designated with overall responsibility for security planning and countermeasure implementation for company-designed critical infrastructure. Another key ingredient to the mix is to conduct exercises, at least annually, to verify the effectiveness of security plans.
TSA also suggests rail companies establish a liaison with other railroad security offices to promote information sharing and security enhancements; and for rail employees to immediately report to the proper authorities all suspicious people, activities and objects encountered. While there are many valid bullet points, it is imperative that railroads and employees make available emergency response planning materials when requested, and work with local communities to facilitate training and preparation to deploy and respond to an emergency or security incident.
Along the access control side, focus is primarily on community safety and security outreach. It is important to establish trespasser abatement programs adjacent to company-designated critical infrastructure, which helps reduce the likelihood of unauthorized people on company property and to enhance the importance of reporting suspicious activity.
To the extent possible and practical, railroads should implement photo identification procedures to company-designated critical infrastructure, plus implement background checks, and safety and security training for contractor employees with unmonitored access to company-designated critical infrastructure. Another effective security practice is to establish measures to deter unauthorized entry and increase the probability of detection at company-designated critical infrastructures, perhaps to include security patrols of varying patterns and time schedules.
En-route security practices vary, as well, but it would be key to maintain systems to locate rail cars transporting TIH materials in a timely manner to be able to implement security needs when necessary and provide information on the location of cars carrying hazardous materials. Another en-route security measure includes on-ground safety inspections of cars containing TIH materials and inspecting for signs of tampering, sabotage, attached explosives or other suggested items. Railroad employees should be trained to recognize suspicious activity and report security concerns.
While in rail yards, to the extent feasible, place rail cars containing hazardous materials where the most practical protection can be provided against tampering and outside interference when appropriate for the threat level in certain geographic areas. It also is important not to leave rail cars containing hazardous materials in rail yards for extended periods of time.
A terrorist attack on the rails isn’t unconceivable, as shown by bombings in Madrid’s and London’s subways. However, the nation’s railroads, both passenger and freight, need protection, as both are important pieces of the transportation network. State and local governments are primarily responsible for rail security. Nonetheless, through the Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program, TSA has deployed 100 inspectors assigned to 18 field offices nationwide. TSA also has raised the profile of rail security by deploying explosive detection canine teams to key junction points across networks, stations, terminals and other facilities.
Mobile checkpoint equipment also is used by fitting the equipment into two, standard-size shipping containers and rapidly deploying the technology for use in screening and detection at any major system in the country.
This work is not completely accomplished during the course of one year, but is improved upon year after year by learning from experience. Over time, adjustments are made, and if it’s done right and security is actually improving, this should reflect on reduced vulnerability and reduced risk.