Where Checkpoint Screening Goes Wrong
- By Ralph C. Jensen
- Jan 03, 2008
The last thing you want to find out while flying
from one city to another is that airport security
has been compromised. With so many people
choosing flights as a preferred mode of transportation,
airport security is paramount.
Like many of our readers, I logged thousands of miles
via air travel in 2007—gratefully, all without incident. But
it would seem that security is another matter.
In testimony before the House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, the Government Accountability
Office dispatched its own investigators to examine TSA’s
passenger screening process. In many cases, GAO investigators
succeeded in passing through TSA security screening
checkpoints undetected with components for numerous
improvised explosive devices and an improvised incendiary
device. These components were concealed in carry-on luggage
and on themselves.
The GAO undertook this study in August 2006 after
TSA substantially modified its passenger screening
policies. This was based on the alleged transatlantic
bomb plot uncovered by authorities in Britain. TSA
wanted to close the security gaps revealed by the plot
and, therefore, revised policies that restricted the amount
of liquids, gels and aerosols that passengers could bring
through a checkpoint.
Six years after 9/11, airport screeners are pretty good at
spotting terrorists, but there’s an excellent chance anyone
trained to get past airport security will succeed.
GAO officials decided to test the screening process via
covert means and identified two types of devices that a terrorist
could use to cause severe damage to an aircraft that
also would threaten the safety of the passengers. The first
device was an IED made of a liquid explosive and a lowyield
detonator. Even the detonator itself could function as
an IED, but it was determined that a liquid explosive would
cause more damage.
The components identified in the covert operation were
passed by screeners at 19 U.S. airports. It should be noted
that some of these airports employ private screeners and,
therefore, are not part of TSA. But it’s rather amazing how
GAO investigators pulled this off. First of all, they scanned
publicly available TSA materials and then designed a
means to get past security. What’s even more frightening is
that screeners had been tipped off that such a challenge
would take place. Also, an internal TSA memo went as far
as to give physical descriptions of some testers and their
methods for concealing the components.
And if things couldn’t get any scarier, the components
for these devices were obtained at local stores and over the
Internet for less than $150. Still wondering if these devices
would work? They were tested at a national laboratory in
July 2007, and it was clearly demonstrated that a terrorist
using these devices could cause severe damage to an airplane
and threaten the safety of the passengers.
What GAO officials found was that it is possible to
bring the components for several IEDs and one incendiary
device through TSA checkpoints and onto flights without
being challenged. Security officers screen all luggage
before allowing passengers to proceed to departure gates.
The technology used by security officers includes walkthrough
metal detectors, X-ray machines, handheld metal
detectors and explosive trace detection equipment.
Screeners at Los Angeles International Airport missed 75
percent of fake bombs during tests that took place two years
ago. TSA does have a legitimate excuse, but pardon me
while I put my tongue in cheek—they said the tests were difficult
and designed to trip up the screeners. Does
TSA then
believe that terrorists like al Qaeda will bring its bombs to
security checkpoints in packages clearly marked “bomb?”
TSA Administrator Kip Hawley came to the defense of
his screeners, saying that this represents only one layer of
airport security. There are, of course, bomb-sniffing dogs
and air crews trained in self defense, he said. I travel quite a
bit, and I’ve never seen a bomb-sniffing dog. I have, however,
been subject to a full-body pat-down search, where
screeners complete additional searches, including the use of
explosive trace detection equipment to detect any irregularities
in body contour that might represent concealed items.
Although the practice is considered somewhat controversial,
TSA has been experimenting with behavioral
screening. As many as 2,000 TSA employees have been
trained to look for signs of stress or unusual behavior.
Passengers considered suspicious may find themselves
under the hot lamp for questioning or even a search.
Consider this: More than 43,000 travelers have been
flagged by behavior-detecting screeners since January
2006. Yes, there have been some arrests; in fact, 278 people
were arrested. None of the people arrested have been
detained on terrorism-related charges. Don’t you think that
in a random sweep of more than 43,000 people, at least 278
criminals would have turned up?
Whether this technique works or not is subject to question,
but what is certain is the fact that screeners need training
in basic observation skills. Another measure to take is
to reprimand screeners who consistently fail tests.
After spending billions of dollars over the past six years,
how is it that TSA officials can fail to stop dangerous materials
from entering airport premises? Congress should
deem this unacceptable and instruct Hawley to fix the problem,
or be dismissed.
TSA has a significant
challenge in balancing
security with efficient
passenger movement at
security checkpoints, and
it should position itself to
plug the holes that still
remain open.
This article originally appeared in the issue of .